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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
The state appeals from the district court’s order suppressing evidence.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Coleton Myers Sessions with manufacturing marijuana, delivery
of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp. 17-18.) He moved to suppress
evidence based on a “police officer’s warrantless entry” into his home. (R., pp. 23-31.)
The state responded, acknowledging the warrantless entry, but asserting the warrantless
entry was justified by exigent circumstances. (R., pp. 33-40.) The district court found the
following facts relevant to the motion:
Sgt. Smith was called to a scene where a man, Stephen Miller, was “on a lawn
unable to move and requesting medical assistance.” (R., p. 68.) Miller was able to move
only his head, the rest of his body was “paralyzed.” (Id.) Miller stated that “he had
consumed alcohol and marijuana prior to the paralysis.” (Id.) An ambulance took Miller
to the hospital. (Id.)
At the hospital officers spoke further with Miller, who told them he had purchased
the marijuana from Sessions and gave them directions to the house. (Id.) Suspecting that
the marijuana may have been laced or contaminated and was the cause of the paralysis,
Sgt. Smith inquired of other officers if they were aware of other incidents of paralysis.
“Sgt. Smith testified he was advised a couple of people had ended up in the hospital.” (Id. 1)
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Sgt. Smith testified that “a credible law enforcement source” had informed him that in
the week to two-weeks prior to Mr. Miller’s incident there had been other incidents of
paralysis following consumption of marijuana associated with Sessions’ house. (Tr., p. 47,
Ls. 6-23.)
1

Sgt. Smith and other officers went to Sessions’ house. (Id.) They knocked and a
woman answered the door. (R., p. 69.) Officers could detect “a strong odor of fresh
marijuana.” (Id. 2) Concerned that the marijuana Sessions was selling was tainted or
adulterated and that such tainting or adulteration could endanger people, the officers
entered. (R., pp. 69-70.) The court noted that the officers did not have any direct evidence
that anyone was currently in distress at the house at the time officers entered. (R., p. 70.)
In concluding that the entry was not justified by exigent circumstances, the district
court noted that officers had “some information” that “a couple of individuals” had been
treated for paralysis officers believed was the result of “tainted marijuana being used or
sold by Mr. Sessions.” (R., pp. 74-75.) The court also concluded that officers had probable
cause to believe there was marijuana in the house. (R., p. 75.) The district court concluded
that there were no exigent circumstances because officers lacked “a report of someone in
distress,” did not “observ[e] a person in medical distress,” were not “told there was a person
in medical distress” and did not “hear[] anyone in distress.” (R., p. 76.) “The officers
needed something more: hearing a person moaning or in distress, observing from the
window or the open door a non-responsive person, being told that someone was
complaining of a symptom of paralysis, seeing someone smoking marijuana believed to be
tainted, etc.” (R., p. 77.) The district court granted the motion to suppress. (R., p. 80.)
The state filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp. 82-84.)
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One officer testified that the odor was “overwhelmingly fresh marijuana,” while the other
testified he smelled fresh, burnt and burning marijuana. (Tr., p. 19, Ls. 9-19; p. 20, Ls. 1822; p. 31, Ls. 11-20.) The district court determined this testimony was “conflicting.” (R.,
p. 75.)
2

ISSUE
Did the district court err by applying an incorrect legal standard to the question of
whether the exigent circumstances warrant exception applied?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Applying An Incorrect Legal Standard To The Question Of
Whether The Exigent Circumstances Warrant Exception Applied
A.

Introduction
The state argued that the threat of immediate injury may create exigent

circumstances, and that persons “were in potential danger of immediate harm” from using
tainted marijuana. (R., p. 35 (underlining omitted).) The district court, however, limited
its exigency analysis to whether officers had reason to believe that there was someone in
the residence who had already been injured by the tainted marijuana. (R., pp. 72-80.) The
district court erred by considering only the exigency of mitigating harm already caused and
failing to consider the exigency of preventing potential future harm. That Sessions or
someone in his home could distribute or use the tainted marijuana in the time it would take
to get a search warrant created an exigency from the threat of imminent injury, and
therefore merited the immediate action of law enforcement.

Because exigent

circumstances existed, the district court erred in granting suppression. By applying an
incorrect exigent circumstances standard that addressed only past harm, without
considering the possibility of preventing harm, the district court erred.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a district court order granting or denying a suppression

motion is bifurcated: factual findings are accepted unless clearly erroneous, but the Court
freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to the facts found. State v.
Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207, 207 P.3d 182, 183 (2009). “Constitutional issues are purely
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questions of law over which this Court exercises free review.” State v. Forbes, 152 Idaho
849, 851, 275 P.3d 864, 866 (2012).

C.

The District Court Applied An Incorrect Standard Where Exigency Exists Only To
Address Harm That Has Already Happened Where The Correct Standard Includes
Preventing Possible Future Harms
It is well settled that home entries necessitated by “exigent circumstances” do not

offend the warrant requirement. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978); State v.
Curl, 125 Idaho 224, 225, 869 P.2d 224, 225 (1993); State v. Sailas, 129 Idaho 432, 434,
925 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Ct. App. 1996). “The test for application of this warrant exception
is whether the facts as known to the [officer] at the time of the entry, together with
reasonable inferences, would warrant a reasonable belief that an exigency justified the
intrusion.” State v. Bunting, 142 Idaho 908, 912, 136 P.3d 379, 383 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing
State v. Barrett, 138 Idaho 290, 293, 62 P.3d 214, 217 (Ct. App. 2003)); accord State v.
Araiza, 147 Idaho 371, 374-75, 209 P.3d 668, 671-72 (Ct. App. 2009); State v. Reynolds,
146 Idaho 466, 470, 197 P.3d 327, 331 (Ct. App. 2008). “Such exigencies” include
“assist[ing] persons who are seriously injured or are threatened with imminent injury.”
Riley v. California, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494 (2014) (emphasis added).
Such a threat of imminent injury can arise from inherently dangerous substances, such as
explosives. Id. (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 n.9 (1977)).
In this case the officers had probable cause to believe that Sessions had marijuana
in his home and reason to believe the marijuana was tainted, deliberately or inadvertently,
with another substance that was causing at least temporary paralysis in its users. Thus, the
marijuana was an inherently dangerous substance that threatened its potential users with
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imminent injury. The officers’ entry to seize the dangerous substance and prevent that
injury was therefore justified by exigent circumstances.
The district court apparently believed that if officers had reason to believe that
someone was already under the paralytic effects of the tainted marijuana the entry would
have been justified by exigent circumstances. This applies only part of the test, however
(assisting the injured), without recognizing that preventing the injury in the first place is
also an exigent circumstance. This is a little like reasoning that the officers would not face
exigent circumstances from explosives until the explosives detonate and injure people.
Because the tainted marijuana was inherently dangerous to health, the officers faced an
exigency that justified immediate action.
The district court implicitly found such an exigency. The district court endorsed
the practice under these circumstances of securing the residence and then seeking a
warrant. (R., p. 79.) Such would still have involved a warrantless entry in order to address
the exigency. The district court’s determination that officers were constitutionally justified
in a warrantless entry to secure the premises to prevent harm should have led to denial of
the motion to suppress.
The district court applied an incorrect legal theory when it failed to recognize that
preventing future injury, as opposed to merely addressing injury that has already occurred,
is within the scope of the exigent circumstances exception. The district court’s decision
should be reversed. Alternatively, the district court’s decision should be vacated and this
matter remanded for application of the correct legal standard.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse or to vacate, and to remand.
DATED this 17th day of December, 2018.

/s/ Kenneth K Jorgensen
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 17th day of December, 2018, served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the attorney listed below by
means of iCourt File and Serve:
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

/s/ Kenneth K Jorgensen
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
KKJ/dd

7

